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Abstract
In this paper, we present ArCOV-19, an Arabic COVID-19 Twitter dataset that covers the period from 27th of January
till 30th of April 2020. ArCOV-19 is the first publicly-available Arabic Twitter dataset covering COVID-19 pandemic that
includes over 1M tweets alongside the propagation networks of the most-popular subset of them (i.e., most-retweeted and
-liked). The propagation networks include both retweets and conversational threads (i.e., threads of replies). ArCOV-19
is designed to enable research under several domains including natural language processing, information retrieval, and
social computing, among others. Preliminary analysis shows that ArCOV-19 captures rising discussions associated with
the first reported cases of the disease as they appeared in the Arab world. In addition to the source tweets and the
propagation networks, we also release the search queries and the language-independent crawler used to collect the tweets
to encourage the curation of similar datasets.
Keywords:Coronavirus pandemic, popular tweets, spread analysis, misinformation, conversational threads, retweets,
social analytics.
1. Introduction
Twitter streams hundreds of millions of tweets daily.
In addition to being a medium for the spread and con-
sumption of news, it has been shown to capture the
dynamics of real-world events including the spread of
diseases such as the seasonal influenza (Kagashe et al.,
2017) or more severe epidemics like Zika (Vijaykumar
et al., 2018), Ebola (Roy et al., 2020), and H1N1 (Mc-
Neill et al., 2016). Moreover, collective conversations
on Twitter about an event can have a great influence on
the event’s outcomes, e.g., US 2016 presidential elec-
tions (Grover et al., 2019). Analyzing tweets about an
event, as it evolves, offers a great opportunity to un-
derstanding its structure and characteristics, inform-
ing decisions based on its development, and anticipat-
ing its outcomes as represented in Twitter and, more
importantly, in the real world.
Since the first reported case of Novel Coronavirus
(COVID-19) in China, in November 2019, the COVID-
19 topic has drawn the interest of many Arab users over
Twitter. Their interest, reflected in the Arabic content
on the platform, has reached a peak after two months
when the first case was reported in the United Arab
Emirates late in January 2020. This ongoing pandemic
has, unsurprisingly, spiked discussions on Twitter cov-
ering a wide range of topics such as general informa-
tion about the disease, preventive measures, proce-
dures and newly-enforced decisions by governments,
up-to-date statistics of the spread in the world, and
even the change in our daily habits and work styles.
In this work, we aim to facilitate future research on
social media during this complex and historical period
of our history by curating an Arabic dataset (ArCOV-
19) that exclusively covers tweets about COVID-19.
We limit the dataset to Arabic since it is one of the
most dominant languages in Twitter (Alshaabi et al.,
2020a), yet still under-studied in general.
ArCOV-19 is the first Arabic Twitter dataset designed
to capture tweets discussing COVID-19 starting from
January 27th till the end of April 20201, constituting
over 1M tweets, alongside the propagation networks of
the most-popular subset of them. To our knowledge,
there is no publicly-available Arabic Twitter dataset
for COVID-19 that includes the propagation network
of a good subset of its tweets. Some existing efforts
have already started to curate COVID-19 datasets in-
cluding Arabic tweets, but Arabic is severely under-
represented (e.g., (Chen et al., 2020; Singh et al.,
2020)) or represented by a random sample that is not
specifically focused on COVID-19 (e.g., (Alshaabi et
al., 2020b)), or the dataset is limited in the period it
covers and does not include the propagation networks
(e.g., (Alqurashi et al., 2020)).
The contribution of this paper is three-fold:
• We release ArCOV-19, the first Arabic Twitter
dataset about COVID-19 that comprises over 1M
tweets collected using Twitter search API.2 In ad-
dition to the tweets, ArCOV-19 includes propa-
gation networks of a subset of 95k tweets, search
queries, and documented implementation of our
language-independent tweets crawler.
• We present a preliminary analysis on ArCOV-19,
which reveals insights from the dataset concerning
temporal, geographical, and topical aspects.
• We suggest several use cases to enable research on
Arabic tweets in different research areas including,
1The dataset will be continuously augmented with new
tweets over the coming few months.
2https://gitlab.com/bigirqu/ArCOV-19
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but not limited to, emergency management, mis-
information detection, and social analytics.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. We
present the crawling process followed to acquire Ar-
COV-19 in Section 2. We then thoroughly discuss the
preliminary analysis that we conducted on the dataset
in Section 3. We suggest some use cases to enable re-
search on Arabic tweets in Section 4. We finally con-
clude in Section 5.
2. Data Collection
ArCOV-19 includes two major components: the
source tweets (i.e., tweets collected via Twitter
search API every day) and the propagation net-
works (i.e., retweets and conversational threads of a
subset of the source tweets). In this section, we present
how we collected each in Sections 2.1, and 2.2 respec-
tively, and summarize the released data in Section 2.3.
2.1 Tweets Collection
To collect the source tweets, we used our tweet crawler3
that uses Twitter search API4. The crawler takes a set
of manually-crafted queries, comprising a target topic,
as input. At the end of each day, the crawler issues a
search request for each of those queries. Queries can be
keywords (e.g., “Corona”), phrases (e.g., “the killing
virus”), or hashtags (e.g., “#the new coronavirus”).
Twitter returns a maximum of 3,200 tweets per query.
We customized the search requests to return only Ara-
bic tweets,5 and to exclude all retweets to avoid hav-
ing copies of the same tweet. Additionally, duplicate
tweets (returned by different queries) are removed in
each day. Finally, tweets are sorted chronologically.
We started collecting our data since the 27th of Jan-
uary 2020 using a set of queries that we manually-
updated based on our daily tracking of trending key-
words and hashtags. The full list of queries used in
each day is released alongside our dataset. We denote
all collected tweets as source tweets.
Due to technical reasons, we missed collecting tweets
for a few days. Due to Twitter search API restric-
tion that limits the search results to the past 7 days,
we missed the old tweets. To overcome that, we
used GetOldTweets36 python library to download the
search results using the same trending keywords and
hashtags we selected around those days.
2.2 Propagation Networks Collection
In addition to the source tweets, we also collected the
propagation networks (i.e., retweets and conversa-
tional threads) of the top 1000 most popular (i.e., top-
retweeted & -liked) tweets each day. To our knowl-
3https://gitlab.com/bigirqu/ArCOV-19/-
/tree/master/code/crawler
4https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/
search/api-reference/get-search-tweets
5The language of tweets to return is a configurable pa-
rameter.
6https://github.com/Mottl/GetOldTweets3
edge, this is the first Arabic tweet dataset to include
such propagation networks.
Before getting the most popular tweets on any day,
we started from source tweets collected in that day
and applied a quality qualification pipeline. We first
excluded tweets containing any inappropriate word
(using a list of inappropriate words we constructed).
Next, tweets with more than two URLs or four hash-
tags, or shorter than four tokens (all are potentially
spam) were dropped. Additionally, duplicate tweets
that have exact textual content are also dropped to
avoid redundancy; only the most popular of them (ac-
cording to our scoring criterion below) is kept. Qual-
ified tweets are then scored by popularity defined by
the sum of the tweet’s retweet and favorite counts. We
finally sort the qualified tweets by their scores and se-
lect the most popular 1,000 tweets. We denote the set
of all such tweets over all days as the top subset.
For those 1,000 tweets per day, we then collected
all retweets and conversational threads (i.e., direct
and indirect replies). We collected the retweets using
Pickaw,7 a platform for organizing contests on social
media, and the replies using PHEME (Zubiaga et al.,
2016) Twitter conversation collection script.8
2.3 Data Release
In summary, we release the following resources as
ArCOV-19 dataset, taking into consideration Twitter
content redistribution policy:9
• Source Tweets: tweet IDs of the tweets crawled
in each day.
• Search Queries: the list of search queries, in-
cluding keywords, phrases, and hashtags, used in
each period to collect our source tweets.
• Top Subset: tweet IDs of the top 1,000 most
popular tweets for each day.
• Propagation Networks: the propagation net-
works for the top subset which include for each
tweet in the top subset:
– Retweets: tweet IDs of the full retweet set.
– Conversational Threads: tweet IDs of the
full reply thread (including direct and indi-
rect replies).
Along with the dataset, we provide, in our repository,
some pointers to publicly-available crawlers that users
can easily use to crawl the tweets given their IDs.
3. ArCOV-19 in Numbers
In this section, we present a statistical summary and
conduct a preliminary analysis on ArCOV-19 to shed
some light on its major characteristics.
7https://pickaw.com/en/twrench-becomes-pickaw
8https://github.com/azubiaga/pheme-twitter-
conversation-collection
9https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-
terms/agreement-and-policy
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3.1 Tweets and Users Distribution
Table 1 presents an overall summary of the tweets and
users statistics in ArCOV-19. It indicates that The
total number of source tweets in the dataset is over
1M posted by about 330k unique users. We note that
16.07% of the tweets were posted by verified users (who
constitute only 1.26% of the unique users). This is a
relatively large percentage, showing that a good por-
tion of the source tweets are popular. The average
numbers of followers, friends, and statuses of users are
also relatively large, showing that users observed in
ArCOV-19 are also popular (and possibly more influ-
ential). The table also indicates that 21.74% of the
tweets include URLs. We anticipate that this is due to
the extensive spreading of news (linked from tweets)
during this period. The numbers of tweets that are
geotagged and geolocated are also indicated in the ta-
ble; however, we defer the discussion of such types of
tweets to Section 3.3.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of tweets over time
in ArCOV-19. It is clearly non-uniform. Moreover,
the volume of tweets hugely increases when the virus
started to spread in several countries in the Arab
world. The figure also shows the distribution of the
tweets posted by verified users vs. unverified users,
showing a similar pattern.
Figure 2 presents the top 25 tweeting users in ArCOV-
19. We notice that several of them are news sources,
and 21 are verified Twitter accounts.
Table 1: Tweets and users statistics of ArCOV19.
Tweets Statistics
Source Tweets 1,090,591
Geotagged 873 (0.08%)
Geolocated 29,708 (2.72%)
Posted by verified users 175,208 (16.07%)
Include URL 237,067 (21.74%)
Include Media 411,577 (37.74%)
Top Subset 95,000 (7.79%)
Retweets of Top Subset 3,821,951
Replies of Top Subset 1,476,950
Users Statistics
Unique 329,278
Verified 4,133 (1.26%)
Average followers count 7,120
Average friends count 1,179
Average statuses count 10,545
3.2 Tweets Content & Topics
It is important to demonstrate that the tweets in Ar-
COV-19 constitute a good representative sample of
the Arabic tweets posted during the target period on
COVID-19, and that they cover the prevalent topics
discussed over Twitter during that period. To help ex-
amine this hypothesis, we analyzed the textual content
of the tweets; in particular, we identified the most-
frequent words, hashtags, and Arab country names in
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Figure 2: Number of tweets posted by the top 25 tweet-
ers in ArCOV-19 .
the entire dataset, then tracked their frequency over
time. Figure 3 shows the time series (over days) of the
three types of keywords.10
The 10 most-frequent words shown in Figure 3(a) in-
dicate two different types of words: those that are di-
rectly related to COVID-19 (e.g., “health”) and those
that are not but related to prayers and supplications
(e.g., “Allah/God”)). It is interesting to see the word
“Allah” is very frequent early on when the news about
the virus started to spread (probably over discussions
around whether the pandemic is a punishment from
God or not, we believe), then declines over time only
to become frequent again when the virus started to
widely spread in the Arab world.
Figure 3(b) demonstrates how “#China” hashtag was
the most trending one from 27 of January until 20 of
February, as COVID-19 was prevalent only in China
and still not widely spread (at that time) in other
countries. We can see how it started to be less trend-
ing as the number of cases started to decline in China
10When identifying the most frequent words and hash-
tags, we excluded the ones we used in our search queries
since they are expected to be very frequent by definition.
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Figure 3: Time series of the frequency (in percentage of tweets) of top general keywords, hashtags, and Arab
country words for the period of 27th Jan to 31st Mar. The time of first reported cases in Arab countries is also
indicated and aligned with the time series.
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by that date.11 On the other hand, when COVID-
19 started to spread in the Arab world, other hash-
tags started to become viral. Furthermore, Figure 3(b)
shows that frequency spikes of “#Iran”, “#Lebanon”,
and “#Kuwait” exactly match the confirmation dates
of first reported cases in Iran,12 Lebanon,13 and
Kuwait,14 respectively.
To further analyze trending topics, Figure 3 features
the timeline of the first reported cases in the Arab
countries and aligns them with the time series through-
out the figure. Aligning the timeline with the series
in Figure 3(c) reveals a significant match between the
frequency peaks of several country names and the cor-
responding dates of first reported cases in those coun-
tries, most notably in UAE, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait,
Oman, Bahrain, Algeria, and Libya.
Figure 3 also demonstrates the power of ArCOV-19
in capturing further controversial and trending topics.
Table 2 shows a timeline covering dates of specific top-
ics of discussion trending on social media around times
of peaks in tweeting frequency in Figure 3(c).
Country Date Topic Related News
UAE Feb 19 Yemeni Foreign
Affairs Minister
thanks UAE for
evacuating Yemeni
students from
China
http://tiny.cc/71qtmz
Iraq Feb 20 Iraq announces
closure of borders
with Iran
http://tiny.cc/yzrtmz
Egypt Mar 2 Egyptian health
minister announces
a visit to China
http://tiny.cc/7iqtmz
Mar 7 Kuwait bans
travels with Egypt
including entry of
Egyptian residents
http://tiny.cc/lqstmz
KSA Mar 4-5 Closure of The
Grand Mosque in
Mecca
http://tiny.cc/iqrtmz
Table 2: Examples of trending topics in social media
matched by spikes in tweeting frequency in ArCOV-19
We further explore the topics discussed in ArCOV-
19 by considering the domains of URLs shared in the
tweets. We focused on the top tweets subset of Ar-
COV-19 (constructed as detailed in Section 2.2) and
identified the URLs posted in those tweets. We then
expanded them (since Twitter URLs are shortened)
and dropped URLs of images and videos to focus
only on URLs referring to external sources. We ex-
tracted 25,678 URLs from 975 unique domains. Fig-
ure 4 shows that URLs from news websites are dom-
inantly the most-commonly shared. We observe that
these news websites mainly originate from three Arab
countries, namely, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United
Arab Emirates. Interestingly, URLs from the China
“Global Television Network” (cgtn.com) are commonly
11https://tinyurl.com/rfj5khn
12https://tinyurl.com/yykgwbox
13https://tinyurl.com/yxkg78g5
14https://tinyurl.com/y4nlgz5h
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Figure 4: Most frequently-linked domains in the top
tweets subset.
shared as well, which can be explained by the fact that
COVID-19 started in and heavily affected China.
3.3 Geographic Distribution of Tweets
Although Twitter provides automatic geo-reference
functionally, few users (solely around 1-3% (Murdock,
2011; Jurgens et al., 2015)) opt to enable it due to pri-
vacy and safety reasons. Alternatively, to have an in-
sight about the geographical distribution and diversity
of the tweets in our dataset, we examined the place and
coordinates attributes of the Tweet object.15 We note
that the place attribute is an optional attribute that
allows the user to select a location from a list provided
by Twitter (therefore, the location might not necessar-
ily show the actual location from where the tweet is
posted), whereas the coordinates attribute represents
the geographic location of the Tweet as reported by
the user or client application.
Table 1 shows that ArCOV-19 has 29,708 geolocated
tweets (i.e., having values in the place attribute) and
873 geotagged tweets (i.e., having values in the co-
ordinates attribute). Those tweets were posted by
2,818 and 133 unique users respectively. The geolo-
cated tweets constitute about 2.7% of the total source
tweets, which is slightly higher than what is reported
in previous studies on disaster datasets (Anderson et
al., 2019).
The geolocated tweets were indeed posted by users
from 85 countries from around the globe. We found
that 94.4% of them were posted from the Arab world.
The largest contribution of the geolocated content
(about 38.7%) comes from Saudi Arabia; this is some-
what expected as Saudi users represent the highest
number of active Twitter users in the Arab world.16
Surprisingly, Kuwait comes second with 11.1% of the
geolocated content. We believe the rationale is that it
was among the first countries that reported COVID-19
15https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/
data-dictionary/overview/geo-objects
16https://tinyurl.com/jmkttt3
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Figure 5: Distribution of geolocated tweets.
cases in the Middle East. Since then, Kuwait started a
series of strict precautions such as a wide lock-down in
many vital facilities until the government had imposed
a nationwide curfew. We think, after the curfew, the
people become more active on Twitter as a platform
to break news and discuss developments of the virus.
Additionally, we used related phrases and hashtags to
“Kuwait”, “Lebanon”, and “UAE” among the tracking
keywords in the period between 22 of February and 13
of March. Furthermore, it is not surprising to see the
countries that have a few or no cases have the smallest
portions of contribution to the content. Others have
small audience userbases on Twitter (e.g., Tunisia).
3.4 Propagation Networks
As discussed earlier, we collected the propagation net-
works of the top subset. Overall, the collected number
of retweets is 3,821,951 for the entire subset, and the
collected number of replies is 1,476,950.
At the time of collecting the retweets, we were not
able to get the retweets of some of the tweets either
because they were deleted or they were posted from
private accounts. For those collected successfully, Fig-
ure 6 illustrates the distribution of retweets per day
using boxplots. It shows that the average (and me-
dian) number of retweets follows a similar pattern to
what was shown in Figure 1 (notice that the Y-axis
here is in log scale). We also notice that a good num-
ber of tweets got more than 100 retweets; some of them
got even larger numbers reaching about 10k retweets
or more, showing highly propagated content.
As shown in Figure 7, we applied a similar analysis to
the replies per day, and found similar patterns to the
retweets.
4. Enabling Research
With the spread of Novel Coronavirus in several Arab
countries and the subsequent procedural measures
taken by the local governments, it continued to domi-
nate discussions over social media (and Twitter in par-
ticular) to the time of this writing. To enable research
on different tasks on Arabic Tweets, we make ArCOV-
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Figure 6: Distribution of retweets per day for the top
subset.
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Figure 7: Distribution of replies per day for the top
subset.
19 publicly-available for the research community. Hav-
ing quantified the topical, geographical, and commu-
nity representativeness of ArCOV-19, we envision that
it is suitable for diverse natural language processing,
information retrieval, and computational social science
research tasks including, but not limited to, emergency
management, misinformation detection, and social an-
alytics, as we discuss below. Furthermore, we provide
propagation networks of daily highly popular subset
(the top 1,000 most popular) to ensure the quality of
tweets. This sample is drawn after filtering out poten-
tial low-quality tweets (e.g., spam) and content dupli-
cates. We anticipate the top subset and the network
to support these tasks on the popular Arabic tweets
that we assume have the most effect on shaping public
opinion and understanding.
Emergency Management: As COVID-19 is an
international pandemic, national and international
health organizations need to analyze the effects of the
outbreak. We believe ArCOV-19 can support sev-
eral tasks in that domain, such as filtering of informa-
tive content, detection of events and sub-events, sum-
marization, identification of eyewitnesses, geolocation,
and studying information (and situational awareness)
propagation, to name a few.
Social Analytics: In addition to sharing reports and
awareness during the outbreak, people tend to discuss
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their opinions (e.g., stance towards the situation and
consequences of the spread) and express their emotions
(e.g., big changes in lifestyle, social distancing, loss
of their beloved ones, etc.). Therefore, analyzing the
tweets to detect sentiment, stance, hate speech, and
generally, offensive language, among other aspects, is
of interest to many stakeholders.
Misinformation Detection: With the sheer amount
of information shared about COVID-19, many rumors
are disseminated and getting high attention from the
community, which causes a fast propagation of misin-
formation. This hinders the efforts of the health and
governmental organizations on fighting the pandemic
as such rumors spread panic and may lead to unde-
sirable consequences (e.g., increase of cases and mor-
tality rate, or lack of supplies due to hoarding). Ar-
COV-19 supports studying information/claims prop-
agation, claims check-worthiness detection and veri-
fication tasks on the most popular tweets. Further-
more, the retweet networks and conversational threads
provide a valuable resource for early detection of fake
news and identification of malicious rumor-spreading
accounts.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented ArCOV-19, the first Arabic
Twitter dataset about the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-
19) that includes propagation networks of a large sub-
set of tweets. We release all source tweets, top subset,
search queries, and the propagation networks. Prelim-
inary analysis showed that ArCOV-19 captured spikes
in tweeting frequency for country-specific tweets that
are consistent with the first reported cases of COVID-
19 in several Arab countries. We also found dominance
of news agencies among top tweeting users and among
most shared URLs. ArCOV-19 enables research un-
der many domains including natural language process-
ing, information retrieval, and social computing. We
plan to continue collecting tweets for the foreseeable fu-
ture and the dataset will be continuously updated with
newly collected tweets and propagation networks.
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